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1. Introduction 
Recent policy and theoretical discussions of the effects of highly skilled 
migration from the underdeveloped countries, the so-called ‘brain drain’, 
have focused on a proposal [Bhagwati (1972)] to levy a (supplementary) 
income tax on those who migrate, the proceeds of such a tax to be 
transmitted to the developing country of origin or to developing countries en 
bloc for developmental spending.’ 
The welfare implications of such a tax were analyzed in an earlier paper of 
ours [Bhagwati and Hamada (1974)] in the context of a model of the 
country of emigration, characterized by sticky wages and HarrissTodaro 
(1971) type of unemployment. In subsequent papers, the tax has been 
analyzed also in the context of modified models, still incorporating the 
unemployment phenomena, by Rodriguez (1975) and McCulloch-Yellen 
(1975).2 Essentially, these models analyze the impact of the income tax on 
emigrants’ incomes as arising primarily through the reduced differential 
*This paper is a significantly revised and augmented version of an earlier, unpublished paper 
[Bhagwati and Hamada (1976)]. Thanks are due to NSF Grant no. SCS-80-25401, to the Ford 
Foundation and to the German Marshall Fund for tinancial support of the research underlying 
this paper. The stimulating atmosphere at the SSRC Workshop on Public Economics at 
Warwick, England, 1978, also must be gratefully acknowledged by Koichi Hamada. We are also 
indebted to Peter Diamond, William Baumol, Assar Lindbeck, John Wilson and other 
participants at the New Delhi Conference in January 1981 for their helpful suggestions. The 
excellent comments of two referees have led to substantial improvements in this paper. 
‘This tax proposal has been explored from the viewpoint of its economic rationale, its revenue 
implications, and its legal (constitutional, tax and human rights) implications in Bhagwati and 
Partington (1976). The present paper can be seen as developing a yet further rationale for such a 
tax (in the version where the tax proceeds accrue to the country of emigration). 
‘For a review of these and other brain drain models in recent theoretical writings, see 
Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975). 
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between foreign (net-of-tax) and domestic salaries for the emigrant class of 
labor: this reduction in differential, in turn, reduces the expected and possibly 
the actual salaries in the home countries and thus generates consequences for 
education, unemployment, income and income distribution (among the 
educated, uneducated, employed and unemployed). 
The present paper takes an altogether different, public-finance-theoretic 
approach to the analysis of the income tax on emigrants. We employ rather 
the framework of income taxation originated by Mirrlees (1971), and 
particularly in the form developed by Atkinson (1973). There, the choice for 
individuals is the length of education, which affects their productivities after 
graduation so that education increases the earnings of individuals while 
simultaneously postponing the realization of these earnings. Atkinson studies, 
in the context of this model, the conflict between efficiency and equity: the 
income tax would redistribute income but also distort the educational choice 
and hence reduce efftciency.” 
In this paper we utilize this basic model to analyze the welfare impact of 
the possibility of emigration to earn incomes abroad and to assess the role of 
taxing migrants’ incomes under alternative assumptions within the model. 
Section 2 lays out the model, with the required modification to consider 
foreign earnings by migrants. It also outlines three policy instruments ~ the 
income tax (on domestically earned incomes), an educational subsidy, and the 
income tax on migrants’ foreign earnings - which are appropriate to 
analyze in the model, for reasons spelled out herein. Section 3 considers the 
use of only one policy instrument, the tax on non-migrants’ incomes, which 
we will refer to simply as the ‘income tax’ throughout the paper.4 Section 4, 
on the other hand, considers the case where the home country can use both 
the income tax and an income tax on migrants’ incomes, simply called 
hereafter an ‘income tax on migrants’.5 Section 5 considers the case where ull 
three instruments are available to the home country. Section 6 offers 
concluding observations, including the possible extension of our results for 
tax policy in relation to migrants. 
‘Note that lump-sum taxation to redistribute income is not being permitted; if it were, the 
conflict between efficiency and equity naturally would disappear! The conflict between efficiency 
and equity in the presence of factor mobility has also been mentioned by Cooper (1973, p, 54). 
‘Our model does not allow for non-migrants to earn foreign income or for migrants to earn 
domestic income, for simplicity. Therefore, an income tax on non-migrants’ income is the same 
as an income tax on domestically earned income. 
‘The United States, Philippines and (in theory) Mexico tax citizens who work abroad, 
regardless of length of residence or legal migration status. Therefore, the ‘income tax on 
migrants’, discussed in this paper is a well-established, international tax-legal policy instrument 
as long as migrants do not change their nationality. Under current international practices, 
therefore. if migrants change their nationality, the ‘income tax on migrants’ would become an 
infeasible instrument. For a lucid tax-legal discussion of these issues, see the valuable papers by 
Oldman and Pomp (1975. 1977, 1979). 
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2. The model and policy instruments 
2.1. The model 
Following Atkinson’s model of optimal income taxation, we assume that 
differences exist in the innate ability of the individuals of the home country. 
Let II be the index of innate ability and S be the length of education that an 
individual undertakes. The innate ability in the initial population, before 
immigration possibility opens, is assumed to be distributed by the density 
function p(n), such that 
‘j; p(n)dn= 1, 
where n, indicates the lower bound of the index of innate ability. Let the 
domestic earning of an individual be a function of his ability and his length 
of education such that f(n,S) indicates the resulting earnings.6 Let f’* (n,S) be 
the earnings if the individual migrates and therefore has foreign earnings 
instead, even though we assume that he has received his education at home. 
These earnings are defined gross of income tax levied by the foreign country. 
Moreover, these earning functions are assumed to be increasing functions of 
n and S, while the marginal productivity of S is assumed to be non- 
increasing. That is to say, 
with subscripts denoting the partial derivatives with respect to the 
subscripted variables. We further assume, for simplicity, that the length of 
working period after education is identical at home and abroad and 
designate it as R. 
The decision whether or not to migrate is then assumed to depend on the 
comparison between the discounted earnings stream at home and that in the 
country of immigration. We assume that if the former exceeds the latter, 
individuals will remain at home; if the former is less than the latter, they will 
decide to migrate and work abroad instead.’ Further assumptions on the 
migration decision will be spelled out in section 3. 
6George Psacharopoulos has pointed out to us that, while it is plausible to write earnings as a 
function of innate ability, the econometric attempts at isolating this relationship have not been 
particularly successful so far. 
‘We could have assumed instead that only a fraction of those who could earn more abroad 
would choose to migrate, with this fraction an increasing function of the difference between 
income earned by migrating and domestic income. However, our assumption simplifies the 
analysis while sacrificing nothing that is critical. 
2.2. The policay in.struttwnt.s 
With this basic framework set up, we now list the three policy instruments 
that we will consider in the paper. 
(1) Lineur incow tas. Following Atkinson (1973) a linear income tax 
implies that the after-tax (non-migrants’) income will be written in the form 
[x+/I,f’]. where CY >O, 1 >/I’ 20. (1 -/j) is the marginal rate of taxation and x 
constitutes the uniform lump-sum payment to each individual. 
(2) Subsidy to rducation. Following Hamada (1974), who demonstrated 
that the use of an appropriate educational subsidy could virtually resolve the 
Atkinson conflict between equity and efficiency, an educational subsidy will 
be considered as implying that the subsidy (G) is given directly to individuals 
enrolled in the educational system. 
(3) Litwur income tax on tnigrutlts. Following Bhagwati, we will consider 
a linear income tax on migrants so that their after-home-country-tax income 
can be written in the form [#Y* +/Pf’*], with the asterisk indicating migrants. 
If we assume that the country of immigration levies its own income tax on 
the migrants’ income such that y* =y +cSj’*, where y* is then the net-of- 
immigration-country-tax income of the migrant. and that the home country’s 
income tax on migrants is levied on y* so as to leave the migrant finally with 
net income equal to [I + ry*], then we must have CC* +/~‘j’* = t + T (y + S,f*) so 
that we obtain the following relationship between the tax parameters:’ 
(4) The we&w criteria. Next, we note that three alternative welfare 
criteria might be deployed to analyze the outcomes under these alternative 
policy combinations. (a) We will generally deploy the criterion of the welfare 
impact of the migration on those left behind (TLBs), examining in turn their 
average income or utility and alternatively the minimum income among 
them a la Rawls (1971). (b) Alternatively, we could have examined the welfare 
impact on TLBs plus the migrants:” as discussed briefly in the concluding 
section.” (c) Finally, we could have taken a global or ‘internationalist’ 
criterion embracing the non-migrant nationals of the country of immigration 
as well in a two-country framework. 
‘Note that the linearity of the income tax on migrants is assumed here. parallel to Atkinson’s 
income tax, but is not a necessary feature of the proposal in Bhagwati (1972). 
‘This criterion would seem more consistent with the view that manv migrants do not change 
their nationalities today and hence are, from a legal untl sociological Viewpoint. members of the 
home country. Cf. Bhagwati (1979). 
“Wilson considers, in his illuminating paper (1978) based on the leisure-work choice model of 
Mirrlees (1971), the effect of migration on the optimal linear tax rate. assuming that the only 
policy instrument is the income tax (on domestic residents). 
3. Income tax in the presence of migration 
We now consider the case, applicable to countries which neither subsidize 
education nor exercise their income tax jurisdiction over citizens working 
abroad, where the home country has only an income tax (on domestic 
incomes) at its command. Precisely, we will analyze the welfare impact on 
TLBs when, in the presence of the possibility of migration to work abroad, 
the income tax is levied at an optimal rate.” Our reference point will be the 
standard Atkinson solution where the possibility of migration is not allowed, 
so that we will then be able to deduce what the introduction of the 
possibility of migration implies for the welfare of the TLBs and the 
associated optimal parameters/rates of income taxation. 
We begin by first indicating how the possibility of migration to earn 
foreign income will influence the two fundamental choices facing an 
individual in this modified Atkinson economy: (1) the choice of the length of 
education; and (2) the decision to migrate or work at home. Note 
immediately, however, that in the Atkinson model without migration, 
efficiency is sacrificed for equity, the loss of efficiency taking the form of a 
reduced length of education since individuals are taxed on their (education- 
augmented) earnings. In our modified version with migration, on the other 
hand, the sacrifice of efficiency will occur on two dimensions: a distorted 
length of education by migrants and non-migrants, bind overmigration since 
migrants escape (whereas non-migrants must pay) the income tax because the 
home country fails to exercise its tax jurisdiction over citizens working 
abroad. 
3.1.1. Choice of’ length cfrducatim 
Assuming throughout that education is always undertaken at home, we 
can see that an individual will maximize his lifetime income from domestic 
earnings, I,, with respect to S (the length of education). Now, 
SfR 
I,= j (C(+~.f’(n,S))e~“dt 
s 
where i is the rate of discount, R is the length of working period, and A E 
“The optimality will reflect the precise choice of the objective function, of course 
(1 -epiR)/i. Since we assume that R is constant,r2 A can also be regarded as a 
constant. Maximizing I, with respect to S. we then obtain the first-order 
condition for a privately optimal decision: 
A(-i(a+/~.f’)+p,fv; =o. (2) 
The second-order condition is satisfied because of the assumption that,f.,50. 
Similarly, if the individual concentrates on foreign earnings as a migrant, 
he will maximize 
(14 
where C is the lump-sum cost of migration (e.g. transportation, etc.) that is 
incurred at the time of departure, ,f‘*(n, S) is the foreign income to be earned 
before tax by an individual with index n, and (~*+fl*.f’*) is the foreign 
income of the migrant net of all income taxation. Recall from our earlier 
discussion of policy instruments that when the home country does not tax 
citizens abroad, c(* and p* will equal the parameters of the income tax 
schedule of the,foreign country, i.e. c(* =;I and /I* =fi. 
The corresponding first-order condition for the migrants’ privately optimal 
decision then is yielded by maximizing I, with respect to S, and is 
A [ - i( x* + jI*,f*) + fi*l’; ) + iC = 0. (2a) 
3.1.2. Decision to migrate and work abroad 
Next, consider the problem of the choice between staying at home and 
working abroad. As stated above, potential migrants are assumed to decide 
whether or not to migrate by comparing the discounted value of income 
streams to be obtained from home and abroad. They decide to migrate 
therefore if the following expression is positive, and not to migrate if it is 
non-positive: 
~(n)={A(cc*+/?*f’*(n,S*))e~is*-Ce~i”*) -A(a+@‘(n,S))e-‘“. (3) 
lZAlternatively, we may assume that the total length (S+R) of life. instead of K. is constant. 
However, this does not change our main results, as indicated by Hamada (1974). In fact. it even 
simplifies some expressions. For example, the optimal subsidy formula becomes G = r instead of 
G=Aicc. 
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Here S and S* indicate, respectively, the length of education given the 
opportunity to work at home or abroad. 
To facilitate our analysis, we additionally assume now that, corresponding 
to the parameters of the income tax schedules of the home country and the 
foreign country, there is a unique value n* of ability above which everyone 
will migrate.’ 3 Hence: 
I(n)>O, if n>n*, 
(4) 
r(n)sO, if nsn*. 
Evidently, the value of n* depends on the tax parameters, cr and /3, through 
their effect on realized discounted incomes. Moreover, since /II’S effect on this 
income equals IX’S effect multiplied byf(n, 9, we can show that:14 
(5) 
Next, reflecting the reality that (thanks to the nature of immigration 
restrictions which are biased in favor of professional, skilled immigrants) 
migration is feasible often for the skilled alone, we will assume that this 
“The analysis of the more general possibility where migration is feasible over the entire 
interval of ability endowment is considerably more complex. Cf. Wilson (1978). 




da a/l dn* 
Thus 
Now, from the expressions of I, and I,, we have: 
Moreover, since the assumption underlying relation (4) presupposes that [(~1,/(?n)~(~1,,,‘i,l)] is 
positive in the neighborhood of n*, it follows that both ?n*/dcc and &*/6fi are positive. 
critical value IZ* is larger than the mean value fi of the ability index, i.e. 
n*>fi. (6) 
Finally, the reader may find it illuminating to consider the critical value II* 
in fig. 1, where I, and I, are drawn as functions of the ability index II and the 
given tax parameters. Our assumption underlying (4) implies that the I,- curve 
intersects the I, curve from beiow only once, with the value of II at the 
intersection being n*. I, shifts upward with an increase in either x or /j, 
However, the increase in the latter case is proportionally,f’(n,S) times grcatcr 
than in the former cast. It follows that the value of II* will increase with 
either c( or /j, as in (5). 
0 n n” > n 
Fig. I 
3.2. Dc$ning TLBs 
Next, before we undertake our analysis of the nature of the optimal 
income tax schedule in the presence of migration, we must carefully consider 
the implication of the welfare criterion we plan to adopt, i.e. the impact on 
TLBs. For, one final complexity needs to be cleared up in discussing the 
TLBs in our modified Atkinson economy. The TLBs turn out, in general, to 
be a variable number of individuals because the critical value II* that serves 
to divide the population in the home country into migrants and non- 
migrants is a function of the tax parameters, 2 and p. Thus, if wc were to 
compare (say) the average welfare of TLBs under one set of (2.p) with the 
average welfare of TLBs under another set of (c(,p), we would in fact be 
comparing different subsets of original population. ls To avoid this difficulty, 
we resort to the following stratagem. We take a value N such that N 5 II* for 
“And we would have an ill-defined problem! Cf. Hamada (1975). 
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all n*‘s associated with the range of tax parameters,” c( and /I, that emerge 
in our analysis. We then redefine TLBs to include only those whose ability 
index lies in the interval [nr,N]. This procedure clearly avoids the ambiguity 
concerning the size of the TLB population by making it i 
in n*. 
3.3. The,fivmal optimization problem 
We are now in a position to analyze the optimal 
nvariant to changes 
choice of the tax 
parameters, c( and /I’, in this modified, ‘open’ Atkinson economy. Consider 
first the utilitarian criterion for judging welfare impact on TLBs. We then 
have the formal problem of maximizing17 
(7) 
subject to the budget constraint 
c&(n)dn=(l-/&o,S)p(n)dn. (8) 
“I “1 
The general solution to this problem being difficult to secure, we assume the 
particular forms of earning function, distribution-of-ability function and the 
utility function that were assumed by Atkinson (1973) in the original analysis 
without migration. Thus, our earning function will be 
f(n, S) = nS (9) 
and we will use the Pareto distribution whose density function is written as: 
p(n)=pKP-‘, for nz 1 
= 0, for n< 1, (10) 
where p is parametrically assumed to exceed 2 and n, is assumed to equal 
unity.” It follows also from eq. (6) that 
n*>p/(p-l)=IZ. (6’) 
“This requirement is in fact stronger than needed. If we solve the problem following the 
procedure discussed below for an arbitrary N, and if the resulting optimal tax parameters 2 and 
fi do not give rise to n* smaller than N, then our our analysis is completely legitimate. 
“Recall that l,(n,a /I) is the discounted value of income stream for individuals with ability n 
and with disposable income (E +pj(f‘(n, S)). 
“So long as the Pareto distribution is assumed, the restriction on n, does not change the 
value of the optimal tax rate in a closed economy. We owe this observation to Tony Atkinson. 
[Cf. Atkinson (1973)]. 
3.4. Thr optimal choice @‘tax parameters 
Our analysis then proceeds by first discussing the implications of 
individual optimizing behaviour in this model, second deriving the feasibility 
locus between the tax parameters that this behavior implies in the presence 
of the restriction that the government’s budget be balanced, and finally 
utilizing this tax feasibility locus to derive the optimal choice of the tax 
parameters, given the welfare criterion adopted. 
3.4.1. Individual optimization 
The individual optimization implies that the non-migrant will choose the 
length of education so as to maximize 
which, under the assumption that everybody spends some time in educating 








where n, = ui/p. 
3.4.2. Tax j&khility loci 
Next, given this individual-optimizing behavior, we can derive the tux 
fksihility locus, reflecting additionally the government’s budget constraint. 
Following Atkinson, we derive this for /I and n,=icr//l (rather than a and p), 
where n,, corresponds to the value of the ability index where an individual 
stops educating himself. In a closed eccmomy, no is smaller than unity if 
~1> 2. This justifies the above assumption that everybody spends some time 
in educating himself.19 Thus, we shall follow this assumption throughout the 
“See Atkinson (1973. p. 100. footnote 2). Since the optimal n, in an open model is smaller 
then the optlmal n,, in the corresponding closed model [cf. fig. 2. and proposition 3(2)], we can 
justify this assumption in an open model as well. 
paper. Thus, we note that the budget constraint (8) can be expressed as: 
n* 
a/ &4dn=(l-/O (8’) 
where n* itself is a function of c( and /I. Moreover, by substituting the Pareto 
distribution, we get: 
a(1 -n*-‘)=(I -fl) 
i 
:(l-n*mlL+l)-(:(l -n*mp) I 





where h(n*)E(l -n*-“)/(l -n*pa+l). 
Now, it is readily seen that if we were to ‘close’ this economy and 
eliminate migration, n*m_ and h(n*) reduces to unity. The tax feasibility 
loci for the ‘closed’ (i.e. without-migration) economy and for the ‘open’ (i.e. 
with-migration) economy, depicting the relationship between /I’ and 11~ from 
(14), are drawn in fig. 2 with a straight line AC for the former case and with 
a curve AB for the latter. 
Before proceeding to the last step of choosing the optimal tax parameters 
from this feasible set, however, we must investigate the properties of these 
loci. First, we must note that the closed-economy locus will be straight line. 
Fig. 2 
Moreover, since (as shown in the appendix, remark 1) h(n*)> 1 for the 
relevant values of II* >2 and li>2, the tax feasibility locus for the open 
economy must lie below that for the closed economy (except when n,=O). 
Second, the slope of the tangent line for the tax feasibility locus for the 
open economy can bc shown everywhere to be steeper than the (unique) 
slope of the focus for the closed economy. That is to say (as per the 
appendix. remark 3) WC can show that 
3.4.3. Thr logarithtttic utilit!,,firni,tiotz 
Now WC can turn to the optimal choice of the tax parameters, given these 
tax feasibility loci. With Atkinson, WC will begin with the utilitarian welfarc 
criterion, i.c. WC will maximize the average utility of TLBs2” Following 
Atkinson again, we will initially assume a specific utility function, i.e. the 
logarithmic utility function. In this case the utilitarian objective is written as: 
(1fJ) 
The social indifference map for the population with ability between 1 and N 
can then be obtained by equating the above expression to a constant, and the 
indiffcrcncc curves can then be drawn convex, as in fig. 2. Moreover, the 
slopes of the tangent lines to the indiffcrcncc curves are identical for a given 
value of /I or, in other words, the tangent lines are parallel along any 
hozizontal line, because the slope 
(17) 
does not depend on the value of no. 
We then arrive immediately at two important conclusions, noticing that 
the optimal tax parameters chosen by the TLBs will reflect the tangency of a 
social indifference curve with the tax feasibility locus, i.e. eq. (15) with (17). 
First, the welfare level attained by the TLBs is strictly inferior to that in a 
closed economy, because the feasibility locus of an open economy is inside 
that for a closed economy.*’ Second, we see that the home country, pursuing 
the utilitarian objective on behalf of TLBs, will choose a lower marginal tax 
rate (1 -fl) if the economy is open rather than closed: the emigration 
possibility, in this sense, forces a less egalitarian policy on the home country. 
To see this, consider fig. 2 again. If the economy is closed, point P will be 
chosen; if it is open, point Q will be chosen. Because the tangency slope of 
the indifference curves along the horizontal line through P is constant, and 
because the tangency slope of the opportunity curve for an open economy is 
steeper than that of the dotted line as indicated by (15) the vertical 
coordinate of Q must be larger than that of P. Since the marginal rate of 
taxation equals (1 -/j’), this amounts to choosing a lower marginal tax rate if 
the economy is open. 
3.4.4. The iso-elastic utility,function 
We turn next to the more general case of an iso-elastic utility function: 
where y indicates the degree of inequality-aversion of society and, as is well 
known, this utility function converges to a logarithmic function when p 
approaches unity. The welfare of TLBs can then be expressed as: 
w= &~P1-Pn’-Pexp (19) 
where A’=const. The marginal rate of substitution between fl and n, can 
then be written as: 
d4 
Along a horizontal line, such that /3 is constant, this absolute slope of the 
indifference curve can be shown to be an increasing function of n, if p < 1, 
“This was shown also in Hamada (1975). 
and a decreasing function of n,, if y> 1 (cf. the appendix, remark 4). This has 
immediate consequences for the optimal choice of the tax parameters in our 
open economy vis-a-vis the closed economy. 
Thus, if p< 1, exactly the same argument as for the case of the logarithmic 
utility function applies and the open economy will be characterized by the 
choice of a lower marginal tax rate. (Note that when p =O, we have the linear 
utilitarian criterion and we are maximizing average income.) 
On the other hand, if p> 1, i.e. the inequality-aversion exceeds that in the 
logarithmic case, the tangency slopes to the indifference curves become 
steeper as one moves horizontally to the left of P. Hence, we cannot assert 
now that the marginal rate of income taxation is necessarily less for the open 
economy.22 
This paradoxical possibility when p> 1, however, can be shown to be ruled 
out in the extreme, Rawlsian case where, as is well known, we are dealing 
with the limiting case of the utilitarian welfare criterion when p+~. In this 
extreme case of inequality-aversion, where we are maximizing the discounted 
income of the individual with the lowest ability, WC can write this discounted 
income, since n, = 1, as: 
so that we have the indifference curve: 
j? en0 = const., (21) 
with a marginal rate of substitution, -dflfdn,, =/I, which is independent of 
11,. Hence, the argument can proceed exactly as with the logarithmic 
utilitarian case (i.e. p= l), and therefore the open economy would be 
characterized by a lower marginal tax rate. 
3.5. Three mqjor propositions 
We can therefore summarize our results thus: 
Proposition I. The welfure level of the TLBs is d&itely infkrior in un open, 
vis-&ok the closed, economy. 
Proposition 2. If’the individual utility,function is iso-elastic with ps I -- the 
logurithmic ,function, with p = 1, and the lineur ,fimction, with /I = 0, being two 
“The deviation from I:n of the slope of the tax feasibility locus is independent of the 
deviation of the tangency slope of indifference curves from the slope at P. Therefore, one may 
get the paradoxical situation in the text if h(n*) is very close to unity, Cc. the possihillty of 
emigration is very small. 
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special cases ~ then the criterion of muximizing the welfare of 
to choice of a reduced marginal tax rate for an open economy. 
TLBs will letid 
Proposition 3. (1) IL however, p> 1, one cannot preclude the possibility thut 
the open economy is characterized by an increased marginal tax rate. (2) For 
the extreme Ruwlsian case, where p-m, the open economy, however, will be 
churacterized by u lower marginal tax rate. 
3.6. r?fficiency implicutions 
Our analysis has focused thus far on the effect on the choice of the tax 
parameters, and the associated welfare impact on TLBs, when the economy 
is open. In doing this we demonstrated the deterioration in the tax feasibility 
locus that the migration possibility entails. Now, however, we shift our focus 
to a related, but distinct, question: How precisely does efficiency get 
compromised in our open Atkinson economy‘~23 
We must distinguish between domestic (i.e. home-country) and global 
efficiency. By the former, we will mean the equalization of the relevant 
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) within the home country. By the latter, 
we will mean the equalization of the MRS within the home country and 
between the home and foreign countries. 
But we will define global efficiency in a restricted fashion: the foreign 
country will be assumed to be behaving optimally vis-a-vis its own 
population, setting its own tax parameters correspondingly. Global efficiency 
will then be defined purely in the sense that the honre country migrants’ 
decision to migrate must reflect the comparison of their gross, unadjusted 
productivities/returns. 
Moreover, we must note that domestic efficiency is not tantamount to 
maximization of domestic income since the latter would also reflect the 
distribution of world income among the two countries. 
3.6.1. Domestic efficiency 
Now, domestic efficiency requires the individual non-migrant to choose the 
socially optimal amount of education. The corresponding first-order 
condition, necessary for a maximum, is yielded by maximizing:24 
S+R 
i f(n,S)e~i’dt=Af’e~iS. 
lAThis question is pertinent to our analysis in section 5. 
141n order that the individual productivity maximization over time coincides with the socially 
optimal choice, we need to use the correct discount rate. As discussed in Hamada (1972) the 
correct discount rate should be the biological rate of interest, i.e. the growth rate of the 
population (plus the posiitive rate of labor-augmenting technical progress). 
which yields: 
A ( ~ if’+ ,fi) = 0. (22) 
This condition is evidently not met in our Atkinson economy where, it will 
be recalled, individuals optimize so as to satisfy 
The equality of (22) and (2) would require that sc=O and p= I, i.e. the 
absence of income taxation! 
If we consider next the migrants’ income as part of domestic income, there 
is a similar failure of equality between the migrants’ choice of the 
individually optimal length of education and the socinll~ optimal choice 
thereof. The former will imply 
A(-i(r*+P*f*)+P*f’f) +iC=O, @a) 
whereas the latter will require 
and (22a) and (2a) will not be equal unless x* =0 and /j* = I. 
In addition to satisfying the preceding two first-order conditions, (22) and 
(22a), for a globally optimal choice (in the restricted sense as defined above) 
of the educational length, global efficiency further requires that the decision 
to migrate depend on whether the following expression is positive or not: 
S*+R .< + /I 
f(n)= S ,f’*(n,S^*)c “dt-Ce is*- s ,f’(n,$e “df 
.q* s 
where s^ and s^* are the values of S and S* satisfying (22) and (22a). However, 
the actual decision to migrate is made dcpcnding instead on whether (3) is 
positive or non-positive. Unless, therefore, coincidentally /I = /i* = I and 
Z= r*, the two conditions will be different. With only domestic income tax 
available as a policy instrument, the home country cannot affect the values of 
r* and fl*, which are solely determined by the foreign government. Thus, this 
third and final requirement for (restricted) global efficiency will not be met 
cithcr. 
4. Income tax and income tax on migrants in the presence of migration 
Consider now a modification to the Atkinson, open economy. In addition 
to the (domestic) income tax, let us now utilize also an income tax on 
migrants. The effect of this is essentially to close the economy from the 
viewpoint of the budget constraint. This, however, will not restore, in general, 
the tax feasibility locus of the closed economy without migration r~rn if the 
income tax is uniformly applied to non-migrants’ domestic incomes and 
migrants’ net-of-foreign-tax foreign incomes. 
For, as long as (some) migrants’ net-of-foreign-tax incomes exceed what 
they could earn domestically, corresponding to any educational level, this is 
tantamount to keeping the economy closed to migration but increasing the 
productivity of these ‘migrants’. Hence, evidently, the tax feasibility locus of 
the open economy with such utilization of the added policy instrument 
constituted by the income tax on migrants will dominate that for the closed 
economy confined only to the use of the (domestic) income tax, the latter in 
turn dominating of course the tax feasibility locus for the open economy 
confined to the (domestic) income tax. 
In fig. 3 this is illustrated by the numbered tax feasibility loci in terms of s( 
and fi referring to the open economies and the locus C referring to the closed 
economy. Locus I! is the locus for the open economy with income tax on 
migrants’ net-of-foreign-tax incomes at the same rates as the tax on non- 
migrants’ domestic incomes (assuming that these incomes exceed what the 
migrants would have earned (gross) domestically), i.e. when 
Fig. 3 
in terms of eq. (5). Locus I, on the other hand, is the tax feasibility locus 
when the open economy cannot use the income tax on migrants. In fig. 3, 
locus ll~locus c~locus 1. 
If the home country were to use ‘prohibitive’ tax rates on migrants, t and 
T, so that it pays migrants to stay home, we revert of course to the closed 
economy locus C. On the other hand, the home country could set these tax 
rates, t and z, ‘monopolistically’ so as to extract the entire rent, if any, from 
the migrants’ working abroad rather than at home, in which case the 
corresponding tax feasibility locus IV will be the ‘best’ one; but it is likely to 
run afoul of explicit human-rights conventions! 
On the other hand, choosing the tax parameters r and T at values that 
substantially reduce the migrants’ tax liability to the home country will result 
in a shrinking-in of the tax feasibility locus. In the limiting case of zero 
income tax on migrants, it will revert to locus 1, but will otherwise dominate 
it. However, it may be dominated in turn by the closed economy locus, as 
when it is locus I in fig. 3, where locus I c locus III c locus C. 
While all this is perfectly clear, it is not possible, without added 
restrictions, to say anything more than that the availability of the income tax 
on migrants generally permits the tax feasibility locus to be improved over 
that in the open economy without this added policy instrument. Hence, 
whether one maximizes TLB welfare more generally or takes the extreme 
Rawlsian case, it would be possible to improve welfare with the use of the 
income tax on migrants.” 
At the same time, it is important to note that the income tax on migrants 
can be utilized so as to correct the choice on migration so as to fulfill the 
global-efficiency requirement that the migrants choose to migrate when their 
gross, unadjusted incomes abroad exceed the gross, unadjusted incomes at 
home. However, it cannot obviously be used to correct the inefficiency of the 
choice regarding the length of education (which requires the use of the 
educational subsidy, as already discussed in the preceding section). 
5. All three policy instruments: Global efficiency and TLB welfare 
maximization 
Now, we know from section 4 that an income tax on migrants can be used 
to correct the choice on migration but cannot correct for the inefficiency in 
the choice of educational length as required for domestic efficiency. At the 
same time, it is evident that the use of an educational subsidy can assist in 
achieving domestic efficiency but cannot correct for the socially inefficient 
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(from the global viewpoint in the restricted sense discussed above) choice on 
migration. It should be evident, therefore, that the use of both the 
educational subsidy and the income tax on migrants ought to enable us to 
achieve domestic and global efficiency. 
An interesting problem for us to analyze, therefore, is the characterization 
of the optimal levels of these policy instruments. Moreover, it would be 
important to ask whether, if the educational subsidy and the income tax on 
migrants were set in this way so as to achieve domestic and global efficiency, 
the tax feasibility locus for this open Atkinson economy would lie outside the 
tax feasibility locus for the open Atkinson economy which cannot use these 
policy instruments at all. In fact, it will. Therefore, we can argue that the use 
of the income tax, the income tax on migrants and the educational subsidy at 
appropriate values can both achieve domestic and global efficiency and 
improve the welfare of TLBs, vis-a-vis an economy that uses only the 
income tax and experiences migration. Indeed, we can go further and show 
that this global efficiency solution will also be characterized by virtual, full 
equity and will, in fact, be the first-best solution for TLB welfare. 
5.1. Achieaing global ejficiency 
Thus, consider first the achievement of (restricted) global efficiency by a 
suitable use of the three policy instruments, by examining the three choices in 
our model: the choice of the educational lengths for non-migrants and 
migrants respectively, and the decision to migrate. 
5.1.1. Choice of the lengths of education 
As for the educational choice of the non-migrant, it is easy to see that the 
first-order condition for a private maximum will be given by 
A{-i(cc+/Ij”f)+j3~~~+G=O, (24) 
as shown in Hamada (1974) for a closed economy, and where G is the 
educational subsidy. On the other hand, we get from (22) the first-order 
condition for a social maximum as: A{ -if+fs) =O. Hence, equality between 
(22) and (24) implies an educational subsidy such that 
G=Aicc=a(l-e-iR). (25) 
By a similar reasoning, we can deduce the educational subsidy for the 
migrants. Thus, the private-maximum first-order condition for potential 
migrants is readily shown to be 
A{ - i(cr* + /?*f*) + p*fz} + iC + G = 0, (24a) 
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and for a social maximum it is 
A{ -if*+.f’.;j+ic=o, (22a) 
so that reconciling (24a) and (22a) yields the educational subsidy for the 
potential migrants as 
G=cr*(l -emiR)-(1 -/3*)X’. (25a) 
However, the educational subsidy must evidently be given uniformly to all 
individuals. Therefore (25) and (25a) should be equated so that we must have 
i a*=r+,_e iR -(1-(1*,c=~+~$gc, (26) 
i.e. if the migration cost C is negligible, the same intercept must be chosen 
for the (domestic) income tax, and the income tax on migrants’ schedules. 
There remains now the problem of the choice between staying at home 
and going abroad. One therefore has to choose the tax scheme in such a way 
as to ensure the socially efficient choice in this regard. In fact, we shall prove 
that the linear income tax on foreign income combined with educational 
subsidy and the domestic income tax. satisttes tins requtrement provided that 
p* is set equal to p. 
Now, the condition for the globally efficient choice for deciding to 
emigrate is 
5* i R 
I 
.\: +R 
p= j j’*emildr-Ce 8’ _ S fe-‘fdt>o, 
S’ s 
(26’) 
where both s^ and s^* are chosen to satisfy the marginal condition for 
securing the efficiency of the length of education. On the other hand, 
individuals will migrate according to the (private) condition: 
++R S* 
r= j (N*+fl*f*)e-“dt-Ce~‘“*+Gje “dt 
S* 0 
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which, in view of (26) equals: 
f*+R S^+R 
SI 1 e-“dt- j e-“dt 
.P s 1 
S’ 
+G j eP”dt-jcm”dt 




+/?* j f*e-“dt-Gee’“* -a j fee”dt>O. 
s’ s 
It is easy to see, however, that the second bracket vanishes. Moreover, if we 
substitute here G = a( 1 -e - iR), it can be seen that: 
s* + R SIR 
1 [ 
S* 
Ix epiLdt- j e-“dt +G ~emitdt-fepit& =O. 
s 0 0 1 




r=p* 1 f*emi’dt-Cepi”* -fi j femi’dt>O, 
P s 
(27) 
Therefore, if and only if /I* is set equal to b, permitting the fulfillment of (26) 
and (27) simultaneously, will the criterion for the optimal decision for 
emigration be satisfied. 
The equalization of (26) and (27) therefore yields the condition for securing 
the globally efficient choice on the decision to migrate: 
p=fi*. (28) 
5.2. Properties of the globally efficient solution 
Therefore, setting the three policy instruments at appropriate values, i.e. 
those that satisfy (26) and (28) will ensure global efficiency in our open 
Atkinson economy. 
At the same time, it is immediately obvious that setting [~!=a* virtually 
close to zero would again ensure, as argued in Hamada (1974), that full 
equity would be achieved alongside domestic (LIIZ$, now restricted global) 
efficiency. Therefore we have a generalization of the closed-economy Hamada 
(1974) result to an open economy, thanks to the availability of one more 
instrument (i.e. the income tax on migrants) when the economy is opened. 
Thus, we can conclude: 
Now it is obvious that the tax feasibility locus for this globally efficient 
open economy will lie outside that for the inefficient open economy which 
cannot use the educational subsidy and the income tax on migrants. so that 
TLBs ought to itnproce their welfare. But, we can go beyond the obvious 
and show something much stronger: namely, that our generalized solution of 
efficiency plus virtually full equity constitutes also the first-best. i.e. the 
welfare-muximizing, solution for TLBs. For global efficiency implies that 
world output, produced by both TLBs and migrants, is maximized provided 
that there is no distortion abroad. At the same time, p*-0 implies that 
maximal revenue is being collected by the home country (x* cannot be 
reduced below x without both disrupting the efficiency condition ord 
eliminating migration altogether and therefore resulting in a closed economy, 
given /j=fi*+O). Therefore, TLB welfare ought to be at a maximum in this 
solution. Thus we can conclude: 
Proposition 5. Thr solution in proposition 4 is. trt the xtme time. the dfitre- 
tnuxitnizingfirst-best solutionjbr TLBs. 
Note finally that /I* is the marginal slope of the disposable income of the 
migrants net of both foreign-country and the home-country income taxes. 
How then are /I and /3* to be equated by the home country given the fact 
that the foreign-country tax schedule is to be considered as cxogenously 
determined? This equality can be achieved simply in the following way. First. 
let the home country extend its (domestic) income tax schedule to migrants. 
Second, as per double-taxation-avoidance arrangements, let the tax payments 
to the foreign country be made deductible as tax credits from tax liability to 
the home country. Third, to allow for the migration cost (C) complication 
already noted, let amount (1 -/I*) iC b e credited also against the tax liability 
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of the migrants to the home country. The satisfaction of the first two 
conditions will then ensure that /3=/I* and, of the third, will ensure that the 
required relationship between CI and (x* [in eq. (26)] will also be satisfied, 
provided the marginal income tax rate for the foreign country is less than 
that of the home country.26*27 
6. Concluding observations 
The main objective of the present paper has been to initiate a formal 
public-finance-theoretic analysis of an important policy issue that has come 
to attract attention from policymakers: namely, the exercise of home-country 
income tax jurisdiction over nationals working abroad. 
Our main results have been developed by assuming that the home country 
maximized the welfare of the TLBs (‘those left behind’). This social objective 
may appear reasonable to policymakers even though nationals who work 
abroad are part of the national population, especially if the TLBs are at the 
lower end of unadjusted income distribution and the migrants at the upper 
end. Our welfare criterion can be regarded as an extension of the Rawls 
criterion, not applied to the individual with minimum income but to a 
predetermined band of individuals who are in lower income brackets. On the 
other hand, one may well want to ask what happens to the migrants’ welfare 
in our exercises in this paper since policies that improve the welfare of the 
TLBs may well be worsening that of the migrants, resulting in a trade-off 
that may need to be addressed in policymaking.2s To adapt our analysis to 
this newly defined objective function, which extends over the augmented and 
full set of nationals, we do not need to amend the derivation of the tax 
feasibility loci in the analysis but rather to amend the (indirect) social 
indifference curves defined on the tax parameters. We hope to return to this 
task in another paper. 
Appendix 
This appendix is designed to prove some properties of the h(n) function. 
the tax feasibility locus, and the social welfare function. These properties are 
“‘As Hamada (1978) has noted, this proviso is generally satisfied for migration from the 
developing to the developed countries. The extension of domestic tax schedules to migrants, with 
double-taxation relief. was proposed there as a device to restore global efficiency in a two- 
country world. 
“Of course, one cannot actually recommrnd this first-best solution without reservations. In 
the real world, the threshold of perception or incentives may be quite high, Moreover, the 
administrative cost of redistribution may not be negligible. Our analysis in this section only 
shows that there is a structure implied in the model of income taxation deployed such that the 
conflict between equity and efftciency can be undone by a combination of proper instruments. 
‘HThe delicate issue of comparing the welfare of different groups of people, in an environment 
where equity and efficiency considerations interact. is beautifully analyzed in the companion 
paper by Baumol (1982) in this Symposium. 
utilized in the text, as noted at appropriate places. We define, as in the text, 
Remurk I. If n* > 1, and ,u> 1, then h(n*) > 1. 
n*-P+l _,*-P 
h(n*) - 1 = l__*-fl+’ >O, for n*> 1. 





(1 _n*-P+l ) 2 
Remurk 3. The slope of tangent line to the opportunity locus expressed by 
eq. (14) in the text is steeper than l/fi as long as the opportunity locus is 
downward-sloping. 
Proof: Totally differentiating (14) taking account of the fact that n* 
depends on fi and no, one obtains: 








When the opportunity locus is downward-sloping, the denominator in the 
brace is positive. (If the denominator changes its sign from positive to 
negative, then the opportunity locus becomes tangent to a vertical line at 
some value of /I and tilts into an upward-sloping locus. However, this 
upward-sloping locus does not interest us because the point on this portion 
of locus can Ilever be efficient.) 
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On the other hand, from (1 l), (13) and the definition of no, one obtains: 
I,=$bexp t . 0 
It is easy to notice that a marginal change in n, shifts the I, 
schedule just /l/n* times as the change of /I shifts it. Therefore, by applying 
the same reasoning as used to derive (5) (cf. fig. l), one obtains: 
c?n* /j &* 
-= 
&, n* S/l ’ (A21 
Therefore. 
i 




=h(n*){l +&(n,K(n*)~)jjjl +iL(n0h.(n*)~)). CA31 
Because h(n*) > 1, fl< 1 and n* > ii, we get: 
AC<‘. 
n*lz(n*) ii (A4) 
Since n,h’(n*)(hz*/LJ/?) is negative, and since the denominator is assumed to be 
positive, one can conclude from (A4) that the r.h.s. of eq. (A3) is larger than 
Iz(n*), because the brace in the numerator is larger than the brace in the 
denominator, which itself is positive. Therefore. we can conclude from (Al) 
and (A3) that: 
which is in fact (15). 
Remark 4. The absolute slope of the indifference curve is 
function of no along a horizontal line if p < 1, and a decreasing 
if p> 1. 
an increasing 
function of no 
Proqf. The Schwarz Inequality says [e.g. Royden (1968, p. 210)]: Let g, and 
g, be integrable functions with respect to dF. Then 
Let us write, for economy of space: 
~~110’cxp[(l -p)n,/n]p(n)dn- j-0’. 
.Tnl -P exp [( 1 - p)no/n] p(n) dn E 1 n1 -O, 
and so forth. 
Then 
< 0, if p> 1. 
For, by the Schwarz inequality applied to dF = exp [( 1 ~ p) no/n] p(n) dn 
and the equality does not hold because the integrands are not proportional 
to each other. 
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